Quirino Grandstand Hostage Rescue – Some thoughts
August 29, 2010 Leave a comment
Last Monday was one of the worst Mondays to ever hit the country. In the space of 12 hours, the country’s image took a very big hit with the hostage incident and the bungled rescue effort. While hostage crises happen in other countries as well, the response of the supposedly elite SWAT team left much to be desired.

Manila's Finest in action
What Happened?
A complete timeline can be found here. To summarize things, an ex-cop named Rolando Mendoza took a bus full of tourists from Hong Kong hostage. He wanted to be reinstated in the police force, as he was expelled due to a case regarding extortion. The police did their usual thing in surrounding the bus and negotiating with the hostage-taker. So far, so good. Just another one of those hostage situations.

He could have been shot by this time.
It started to break down some time around 6pm when the Ombudsman’s letter was delivered. It was hoped that it would resolve the crisis, but this was not the case. As tensions rose, someone ordered the arrest of Gregorio Mendoza, the brother of the hostage taker who is also a policeman.
It is speculated that this is what drove the hostage taker over the edge, since he was monitoring everything on the television set inside the bus, and all of these events unfolded live on national television. Soon after, shots were heard and the driver of the bus was seen running away, saying that all of the hostages have been shot. An assault was immediately mustered…
…And everyone now knows what happened. From 7:41pm to 8:43pm, the police struggled to open the bus door, to break the bus windows, and generally trying everything they could think of to bust inside. An hour after the assault began, the hostage taker was dead, but hostages died with him.
What went wrong?
The Manila SWAT team was subject to much scrutiny and criticism after this incident, even from its own members. Most of the comments centered on their lack of equipment, the lack of training, and most importantly, the lack of decisiveness which prevented them from enjoying the shock and awe effect so important to subduing or killing the hostage taker without endangering the hostages. The carnage resulted from some key errors that included:
Live media coverage. The media had front-row seats to the whole affair, and so did the entire world. That also meant that Mendoza was able to monitor the actions of the police force, from arresting his brother to the movements of the assault force. Information asymmetry surprisingly favored the hostage taker, as he knew what was happening outside but the police force didn’t know what was going on inside the bus. This was disastrous, as Mendoza was able to prepare for whatever the police team was working on.
Taking control of the tactical situation. One journalist from Reuters mentioned that it was like a movie set, because the floodlights of the Quirino Grandstand illuminated everything perfectly. Because it was dark inside the bus, it was obvious that even without media coverage, Mendoza still had a better view of the outside world than the outside world would have had of him. The tactical situation clearly favored Mendoza – the clear field of fire around the bus and the lights amounted to a well-lit shooting gallery for him, had he chosen to attack the assault force. It denied the assault force a stealthy entry that would enhance the effects of a violent and decisive assault.
Crowd control and the lack of expertise in handling the situation also took their toll. Even now, people are starting to point fingers at each other as to who actually had responsibility for which actions. The lack of a clear chain of command looks bad now, but it was infinitely worse in a scenario where everyone had to move promptly and purposefully. That required a voice of command recognized by all, which wasn’t the case here.
In a situation like this, the ideal approach would be to deny as much information as possible to the hostage taker. This means that the authorities would be able to manipulate information to their advantage in resolving the issue. However, there was no attempt to do this. Mendoza was on the phone, could watch television, and he was in the middle of an area bathed in light. With all these advantages, it is surprising that some hostages actually survived.
Decision to use SWAT. The Armed Forces of the Philippines had the Army Scout Rangers, the Marine Force Reconnaissance and Scout Snipers, the Navy Special Warfare Group, and the Light Reaction Company, with personnel drawn from the other elite forces. Every single one of those units have had training and experience with hostage taking situations, but their offer was turned down. The Manila police also turned down the offer of the Special Action Force of the Philippine National Police, a commando unit of the police trained along the lines of the Special Air Service. The reason given was that SWAT seemed capable. That reasoning is not enough. “Seemingly capable” would not be enough to risk the lives of hostages, not when there are other units that are actually capable of doing the same thing.
That is like going to race and then choosing a Lancer Evolution over a Formula One car simply because the Lancer can race, just not against more powerful cars. That was the case in the incident last Monday. Naturally, there is the matter of jurisdiction, but I think with lives at stake, there should have been more thought given to this decision.
Lack of decisiveness. After the decision was made to use SWAT, they immediately showed the world just how badly they have been trained. Perhaps this video would show it better.
Underestimating the hostage taker. Rolando Mendoza was from all accounts, a decorated cop with all the training, experience, and skills it implied. Regardless of the shenanigans that caused him to be expelled from service, he had the tactical sense to park the bus in an area that offered him a clear field of fire, the knowledge of police tactics that enabled him to deny them access to the bus, and the good sense to fire only when policemen were already inside the bus, sending them scampering for cover. That meant that the police should not have been overconfident about the situation, thinking that it’s another run-of-the-mill hostage incident.
Second, it’s amazing that they actually thought they can deal with the hostage taker. The mind of Mendoza that made him think taking a bus full of tourists hostage would get him back into the force is a mind that has been warped far beyond rationality. That means he should have been considered dangerous from the start and the hostages considered as in mortal peril. Apparently, either it did not occur to the police, or they didn’t bother pursuing that line of thought.
Training and equipment could be criticized, but they did have the training and they did have the equipment. What was lacking was direction and a firm hand to control their actions. Up against an opponent with the advantages mentioned above, and you have the perfect elements of a bad action film. Except of course, it caused 8 real people to die in this instance.
What Can Be Done?
The video above has been making the rounds in Facebook as the textbook case for an assault for a bus. Although the tactical situation might be different, speed was the primary consideration in the assault. Notice as well how they were firing into positions occupied just a second or two later by their comrades. That level of competence, confidence, and decisiveness must be the objective of any new training program for hostage situations.
As SWAT units all over the archipelago now prepare for a similar incident in their respective jurisdictions, a more critical view of the protocols on hostage situations, if they exist, must be done. The protocol is the rule book that everyone must consult, and even the presence of the best-equipped and -trained hostage rescue force would not equate to success if the people in charge do not know what they should do.
The protocol should include the following:
1. Lethal force is to be used at the soonest possible time. It’s not about deterrence or lust for blood. It’s practicality. Once all hostage takers are identified and an opportunity is presented where they can be shot without any risk for the hostages, that opportunity should immediately be taken by the ground commander without the need to consult higher authority.
2. Complete tactical control of the situation must be imposed. Cellphone and radio jamming, lights or the lack thereof, media presence, crowd control – everything that could help the assault force deny information to the hostage taker must be subject to the control of the ground commander. It will give the negotiator more things to work with (trading hostages for trivial concessions instead of more serious ones) and allow the assault force to set up their attack with fewer risks.
3. A clear chain of command. There should be a ground commander in charge of everything. The tactical commander (leader of the assault force), the negotiator, and perhaps another commander in charge of crowd control, should all report to the ground commander and obey his orders promptly.
4. One professional negotiator. There should only be one negotiator, and that someone should be a professional. Letting politicians and media personalities negotiate with the hostage taker should be avoided at all costs. Not only does it allow the rescue team to better manipulate the hostage taker, it would also allow them to assess risks to the hostages better.
Hopefully, this incident would demonstrate the penalties of failure on the Manila police force and everyone else involved in rescuing hostages. As politicians and police officials bicker and point fingers, it would be great if they remember that the entire point of a police force is to risk their lives to protect others.